The Glorious Revolution, Economic Institutions and the Developing World by Afzal, Aqdas
       
 
Running Head: GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 1 
The Glorious Revolution, Economic Institutions and the Developing World 
Aqdas Afzal 
Department of Economics 
University of Missouri – Kansas City 
 
 
Abstract This paper critically examines the relative merits of New Institutional Economics 
(NIE, hereafter) versus the critical institutionalist method of institutional analysis. The paper 
sketches how the Glorious Revolution, a seminal event in British economic and political 
history, has been analyzed by NIE. Using material from both economics and political science, 
this paper argues that the NIE analysis, in general, and that of the Glorious Revolution, in 
particular, shows a considerable amount of theoretical weakness. Instead, the paper forwards 
the critical institutionalist method to present a comprehensive institutional analysis of the 
Glorious Revolution. The paper also underscores the changing nature of resource distribution 
and culture in Britain as key variables. Finally, the paper also highlights the role of the 
“Whigs” as key agents in bringing about the events associated with the Glorious Revolution.  
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The Glorious Revolution, Economic Institutions and the Developing World 
 
At least for the last two decades, the field of economic development has been 
dominated by New Institutional Economics (NIE, hereafter).  NIE scholars make a case for 
considering “institutions”—conceived narrowly as “rules of the game”—as a veritable 
panacea for all the economic problems facing the developing world. However, the absence of 
institutional convergence, the persistence of dysfunctional institutions and the lack of 
contextual analysis for developing countries behoove us to critically examine NIE’s efficacy 
as a relevant paradigm for institutional analysis, especially in the context of developing 
countries. Specifically, “credible commitments,” a term first popularized by two NIE 
scholars, Douglass North and Barry Weingast (1989), has probably been one of the more 
widely used terms in economics, as well as in political science.  
In the first section of this paper, I sketch how the Glorious Revolution, a seminal 
event in English (later, British) economic and political history, has been analyzed by the NIE. 
I will show that the examination, in general, and that of the Glorious Revolution, in 
particular, depicts a considerable amount of theoretical weakness, especially with respect to 
the omission of key explanatory variables like distributional conflicts and bargaining power 
asymmetries. In the next section, I will use the critical institutionalist method to present a 
comprehensive institutional analysis of the Glorious Revolution. In the critical institutional 
argument forwarded in this paper, the changing nature of resource distribution and culture in 
Britain are pointed out as key variables. At the same time, the role of the “Whigs” as key 
agents is also underscored in bringing about the necessary events that came to be associated 
with the Glorious Revolution.  
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I. Historical Background 
Douglass North and Barry Weingast (1989) make a case for the singular importance 
of the Glorious Revolution in England in terms of setting England on the course towards 
economic growth and prosperity. According to the authors, before the Glorious Revolution of 
1688-89, the fundamental problem in England was the monarchy itself. In the absence of 
statutory taxation, the monarchy was unable to “credibly commit” itself toward protecting the 
property rights of the English subjects. The monarch was free to impose taxation and take 
away gains without prior notice. As a result of this persistent uncertainty, the system of 
incentives was stacked against economic growth. 
During the Glorious Revolution (1688-89), King James II of England was defeated by 
an invading Dutch Army. As a result, William III of Orange-Nassau and his wife Mary II 
became joint monarchs. The Glorious Revolution led to significant recalibration in the 
institutional makeup. Through this institutional recalibration, the English government, the 
NIE argument goes, was finally able to convince the people that the government would not 
engage in arbitrary taxation. Finally, the system of incentives was properly aligned to kick 
start the process of economic growth, thus placing England on the path to the Industrial 
Revolution, economic development, prosperity and the British Empire.  
2. Analysis of the Glorious Revolution in NIE 
The institutional analysis presented in North and Weingast (1989) is one of the many 
permutations of NIE’s conceptualization of institutions as the “rules of the game.” In a 
political context —as in the Glorious Revolution— the authors argue, political institutions 
and the constitution of a state play a determinative role with respect to what course a state 
takes in terms of economic development.  
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The authors conclude that appropriately designed institutions are important for two 
chief reasons: First, appropriately designed institutions improve the workings of a political 
system by acting as constraints in situations where other non-institutional constraints fail to 
deter one of the agents from reneging on agreements. Second, these appropriately designed 
institutions, according to authors, are also essential for economic growth. Absence of credible 
commitments leads to tremendous uncertainty and thus militates against economic growth by 
dissuading would-be entrepreneurs and investors.  
3.The Paucity of NIE Institutional Analysis 
Despite the many permutations of institutions, NIE intellectuals end up granting pride 
of place to secure property rights. North and Weingast (1989) make a case for the state to 
credibly commit against arbitrary taxation through enforcing secure property rights as secure 
property rights provide the best protection against potential predation by the state. However, 
there are a number of problems with this line of reasoning: First, the NIE assertion that 
having secure property rights will lead to economic growth misses the larger point that 
people in the developing world, at times, require completely different type of property rights 
(Bardhan, 2006). The type of property rights being promoted in NIE are the Anglo-Saxon-
style property rights that establish asset or land ownership through titles and deeds. In so 
doing, NIE’s promotion of secure Anglo-Saxon-style property rights misses the reality of life 
in many developing countries, where people, lacking asset or land ownership, require 
completely different type of property rights. For instance, a micro-enterprise owner in a peri-
urban area in South Asia may require protection from extortion by the local goons (Bardhan, 
2006). In the final analysis, the attractiveness of any set of property rights varies with 
people’s differing socio-economic status—where big corporations consider protection from 
excessive taxation to be a property right, micro-enterprise owners see protection from 
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extortion as property rights. In this way, NIE is guilty of painting a picture with broad strokes 
that appears reductive, at best, and downright Western-centric, at worst. 
Second, another omission in the NIE literature is the absence of any recognition of 
whether establishing property rights, the prescribed medicine for economic development, 
results in any pernicious side effects on a region’s ecology. There is plenty of evidence to 
support that establishing property rights is not always ecologically neutral. James Scott 
(1998) has shown that “scientific agriculture” based on the modern property rights regime 
has been an unmitigated ecological disaster, especially in Africa. Moreover, Mathew 
Forstater (2002) has documented how the establishment of property rights led to the utter 
ecological ruination of the Maasai of East Africa. Forstater shows how attempts at 
establishing property rights by the colonial and post-colonial governments of Kenya and 
Tanzania, reduced the Maasai to be only able to sell the bones of their dead cattle since most 
of their livestock had perished in repeated droughts.  
Third, another issue is that questions regarding the morality of establishing secure 
property rights—whether the establishment is just, fair or equitable—are given short-shrift by 
NIE. Usually, the establishment of secure property rights for one group entails dispossessing 
another group of its traditional rights of usage and ownership. The forced removal of native 
Americans from their ancestral homeland by the United States government to “Indian 
Territory,” west of the Mississippi River, has been widely documented in popular media. In 
Britain, the Enclosure movement, which was at its peak from 1760-1830, landowners fenced 
in commonly farmed land, thereby pushing hundreds of thousands of rural dwellers towards 
urban centers in search of sustenance constituting a major social upheaval.  
Fourth, another problem with NIE is the way in which the promotion of secure 
property rights is touted as the shortest route to economic growth. This NIE claim is a 
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function of conceptualizing economic growth as a coordination problem—a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma Game. Without property rights, human existence remains beset with the “tragedy of 
the commons” (Hardin, 1968), whereby individuals “...pursue their private objectives to 
disastrous consequences for themselves and others” (Bowles, 2004: 27). There are two main 
ways in which property rights are said to help with providing a channel to economic 
development. First, it is argued that property rights provide an external enforcement 
mechanism through which economic agents can reach and remain at the Pareto-optimal 
equilibrium, as opposed to being doomed to the Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium.  
The second way in which property rights are said to save the day with respect to 
economic development has to do with changing the very nature of the process of economic 
growth from a prisoners’ dilemma to what Samuel Bowles has termed the “Invisible Hand 
Game.” In the Invisible Hand Game there exists a single Nash equilibrium that is also Pareto-
optimal, thus in a two-person game “...the self-interested actions of both actors yield an 
outcome that maximizes the well-being of each” (Bowles, 2004:41). In other words, the 
second solution through which property rights assist with economic growth is through 
changing the very nature of the problem at hand.  
There are two main issues with the claim that property rights can solve the 
coordination problem of economic growth. The first issue has to do with the fact that 
providing secure property rights is simply not possible unless a individual or an organization 
can monopolize the use of violence; the Weberian conception of the state. For unless the 
capacity to undertake violence can be monopolized through state formation, un-ending 
violence between warring factions, clans or tribes in a Hobbesian “state of nature” would 
ensure that not even the idea of property rights exists. What may belong to one clan today 
might end up belonging to another faction tomorrow. In a sense, the purported solution to the 
coordination problem of economic growth in the shape of secure property rights in in itself a 
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coordination problem—establishing secure property rights is a nested prisoners’ dilemma. In 
political science, nested prisoners’ dilemmas are studied through the so-called sequencing 
debate that analyzes whether the state formation happened before the formation of democracy 
or democratic institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2015). Thus, what is being claimed as a 
solution is dependent on the state for enforcement, while the coordination problem inherent 
in state formation is not explained. 
The second issue has to with the plethora of evidence that points in the opposite 
direction as opposed to what we are being told by the NIE. Even if we accept markets as 
coordination mechanisms, the efficacy of the state as a superb coordination mechanism 
cannot be ignored. The East Asian state, for instance, played a significant coordinating role in 
setting the region on the path towards economic development. The East Asian state 
intervened in the capital markets to regulate credit allocation to designated “winners”, 
promoted industrial investment, underwrote risks and guaranteed loans and established public 
development banks, to name a few instances (Amsden, 1989).  
Finally, the biggest gap in the NIE literature on institutions is an incomplete theory of 
institutional genesis and change. The story of the Glorious Revolution, as told to us by North 
and Weingast (1989), simply states that new institutional arrangements arise when certain 
principals realize the institutions’ importance and hence decide to play by the new “rules of 
the game.” For instance, after William and Mary became joint monarchs of Britain, they just 
“realized” that violent and frequent expropriation of surplus from the citizenry was counter-
productive and thus they agreed to play by the rules and provide secure property rights.  
If getting the right institutions is a matter of realization, it naturally begs the question 
as to why dysfunctional institutions even exist? Institutional re-calibration should have 
automatically occurred in the favor of Anglo-Saxon-type property rights by now in almost all 
  
Glorious Revolution and Economic Institutions   8 
human societies as the re-calibration, ala NIE, is a function of the “realization” regarding the 
efficacy of secure property rights. In other words, we should have witnessed a greater level of 
convergence between local institutions and those that belong to the Anglo-Saxon private 
property rights tradition. It goes without saying that reality is not so. 
The actual reason why we do not see convergence in the institutions of property rights 
around the world has to do with the fact that the NIE theory of institutional change does not 
take two very important variables—vested interests and collective action—into account. The 
first omitted variable is vested interests or the distributive conflicts and asymmetries in 
bargaining and mobilizing power among various social groups, especially in poor countries. 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) have shown that, at times, it may not be in the interest of a 
dictator to carry out institutional changes that safeguard property rights or contract 
enforcement—institutional arrangements that improve overall economic performance— 
because such institutional changes carry the potential for “…upsetting the current 
arrangement for the uncertain prospect of share in a larger pie” (Bardhan, 2006:20). 
Perhaps, the most convincing explanation for sticky dysfunctional institutions pertains 
to distributive struggles in the historical evolution of land rights in developing countries. 
According to Bardhan (2006), empirical evidence from most developing countries suggests 
that large land holdings are not economically efficient. If we are to give any credence to the 
NIE theory of institutional change, then the landholders in developing countries would have 
had their “eureka” moments by now and they would have parceled out their large land 
holdings to small farmers in order to grab the surplus generated due to this efficient 
reallocation. As a matter of fact, the direction of land sales is often in the opposite 
(inefficient) direction, i.e. from small landholders towards large landholders and 
moneylenders. 
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The second reason for the perpetuation of dysfunctional institutions owing to 
distributional conflicts has to do with political reasons. In this case the large landholders 
resist reallocation of land that they know is inefficient due to the fact that the leveling impact 
of redistribution reduces their social and political power as well as their ability to control and 
dominate non-land transactions. In other words, the greater the degree of inequality in a 
society—owing to distributional conflicts—the greater is the likelihood of dysfunctional 
institutions. 
Finally, another reason why dysfunctional institutions persist in various guises has to 
do with the relationship between collective action and distributional conflicts. In comparisons 
of macroeconomic performance from East Asian countries, it has been noted that the reason 
why East Asian countries were able to develop economically had to do with the relatively 
equitable nature of asset distribution, particularly due to land reform, expansion of education 
and basic health services since having a relatively equitable distribution of resources makes it 
easier to enlist the support of various social groups and thus find a solution to problems of 
“free riding.” 
4. Critical institutionalism 
As opposed to NIE, which relies on methodological individualism as its ontological 
commitment, critical institutional analysis relies on methodological holism. Using 
methodological holism as an ontological foundation enables critical institutionalist analysis to 
incorporate the interplay of resource structure, culture and human agency.  
Tauheed (2013) builds a usable definition of culture as culture includes 
“…technology (“tools and skills”) and its “symbols, stories, rituals and world-views,” all 
developed from collective experience in past problem solving (2013:7, parentheses and 
quotes in original).”  At the same time, resource structure (r-structure, hereafter) is defined as 
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“…the distribution of resources to agents as an outcome of past social action (Tauheed, 
2013:7).” The idea here is that with a definition of r-structure, we want to capture the actual 
distribution of resources that is available to various agents at a given time. 
Tauheed defines agency as “…the degree of awareness people have of their power to 
interact with and to re-make their social environment to suit their needs” (p.7). Agency is a 
“psychological construct” that concerns people’s “beliefs” about their capabilities and thus 
the probabilities of success in carrying out their personal agenda. In this sense, agency 
becomes informed and possible purposive action. In this way, defining agency as purposive 
human action, critical institutionalism puts the agents back into the calculus behind social 
action.  
In section I, I argued that bargaining asymmetries in distributional conflicts leads to 
the persistence of dysfunctional institutions. By glossing over entrenched distributional 
conflicts, NIE is unable to provide us with an answer as to why dysfunctional institutions 
exist. However, by specifically taking resource distribution into consideration, critical 
institutionalist analysis incorporates entrenched distributional conflicts, in rich as well as in 
developing countries and thus provides us with an answer to the question pertaining to 
dysfunctional institutions. In this way, critical institutionalism gears towards providing a 
workable theory of institutional change that can explain why dysfunctional institutions persist 
and how under certain conditions institutions transform. 
5. Analysis of the Glorious Revolution in critical institutionalism 
R-structure and Culture. The process of significant change in Britain’s r-structure and 
culture had commenced at least one hundred years—if not earlier—prior to the actual years 
in which the Glorious Revolution took place. In the following paragraphs, beginning with the 
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Enclosure Movement, I detail some of the changes that had a profound impact on Britain’s 
society in terms of profoundly changing the distribution of resources and culture. 
First, since agriculture held a central place in British society of the seventeenth 
century, distributional changes in agriculture carried a lot of significance. According to 
O’Gorman (1997), Britain was going through a veritable revolution in agriculture from the 
early years of seventeenth century onwards. As a result, …[h]arvests were good...[b]y the end 
of the century England was feeding herself comfortably and had even begun to export grain” 
(O’Gorman, 1997:20–21). Though few statistical records exist from that era, research of wills 
and probates shows that all over Britain there was increased wealth, improvement in 
machinery as well as a willingness to invest in newer techniques for increasing agricultural 
yields (O’Gorman, 1997). 
Enclosures also had a significant impact in aiding the expansion of agricultural 
production in Britain. Enclosures had been proceeding for centuries, O’ Gorman points out 
that by 1660 only 50 percent of the English farm land needed to be enclosed (1997). The 
rationale behind enclosure was clear from the perspective of landowners. Unenclosed land 
was uneconomic and its haphazard distribution in the shape of immense open fields made it 
rather difficult to carry out experiments in crop rotation as well as in animal breeding (O’ 
Gorman, 1997). Enclosures constituted a major social upheaval in British society by pushing 
hundreds of thousands of indigent masses towards the cities (Polanyi, 1944). However, where 
the forced exodus of people towards the major British cities constituted an upheaval, it was 
pivotal in turning British cities into major industrial centers (Coward, 1994) as well as 
providing the necessary fillip to agriculture as these large urban populations now had to be 
fed. 
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Second, where changes in agricultural productivity were changing the r-structure in 
Britain, simultaneous development in international trade were creating a new “trader” class 
that came to play a crucial role in the transformation of Britain as this trader class gained 
political clout—in the shape of the Whigs. According to the data provided by O’ Gorman, 
British exports roughly doubled between 1640 and 1700. One of the reasons why British 
exports doubled during this time has to do with the availability of new protected markets, 
especially in North America. At the same time, the introduction of new textile products, both 
for the domestic as well as the international market ensured continued economic growth. It 
can be assumed that the more international trade grew the more politically significant the 
Whigs became. 
In terms of culture, the role of technology increased in exponential terms in the years 
prior to the Glorious Revolution. One example of the exponential increase in technology can 
be gleaned by the amount of deadweight tonnage (DWT) that was being carried by British 
merchant marine fleet. By 1688, Britain had the largest merchant marine fleet in the world, 
with a carrying capacity of 3.4 million tons in 1686, up from 2 million tons in 1660. This 
exponential increase in the use of technology is also evidenced by the rising amount of coal 
output in Britain. Though actual numbers are not available, Coward (1994) has shown 
through anecdotal evidence that most of the biggest coalfields in Britain started being utilized 
in the beginning of the seventeenth century. Rising coal usage was directly linked with the 
expansion of smelting of lead, copper and tin. This initial expansion of the metal smelting 
fueled by coal laid the eventual foundation of the development of the metal industry in 
Britain. 
Agency. By the time of the Glorious Revolution, the political faction dominated by “Whigs” 
was on the ascent. Indeed, the immediate period after the Glorious Revolution is sometimes 
referred to as the golden age of Whig ideas in Britain. In the critical institutionalist analysis 
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of the Glorious Revolution presented in this paper, therefore, Whigs are the agents who 
actually carried out the institutional changes that came to be associated with the Glorious 
Revolution. Since agents act according to their agendas, the specific agenda of the Whigs can 
be characterized by their stance on three main issues: monarchy, religion and economy.  
Whigs developed their views on monarchy in opposition to the traditional conception 
about monarchy in Britain. Whigs, for instance, rejected the argument for monarchy’s 
“divine right” and “hereditary succession.” In a sense, Whigs believed and argued for a 
limited and constitutional monarchy that could not extract excessive surpluses from the 
economy, at will. This desire to control the fiscal excesses of the monarch was manifested in 
the firm Whig belief that the Parliament must have supremacy over monarchy, especially in 
relation to royal expenditure and in the ability to generate new taxes. 
The Whig position on religion can be summarized as one based on selective tolerance. 
As opposed to their political opponents, the Tories, Whigs were willing to show more 
toleration for those groups that had formally separated from the Church of England. These 
groups came to be collectively known as the “English Dissenters.” Rather ironically, 
however, Whigs were opposed to having Catholics in any position of power in Britain.  
The Whigs, in essence, were the very physical embodiment of Classical Liberalism. 
Whigs believed in maximal personal, political and social liberty. As a natural extension, 
leading Whigs were in favor of laissez-faire and free trade. John Locke was a quintessential 
Whig. As a matter of fact, Locke waited to publish his work (1690) until the dust had settled 
after the Glorious Revolution and property rights had carried the day. Locke is perhaps the 
most important intellectual for modern capitalism as he provided a justification for Anglo-
Saxon style of property rights. Increasingly, Whigs came to be associated with the emerging 
industrial interests (metals, commerce etc.) and wealthy merchants (international trade) as 
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where the former were leery of absolute monarchial powers, the latter preferred laissez-faire 
with taxes at a minimum, if any.  
Conclusions 
This paper began by critically examining the relative merits of two techniques of 
institutional analysis, namely NIE and critical institutionalist technique. In the first section of 
the paper, I evaluated how NIE institutional analysis proceeds, by focusing on the way NIE 
has dealt with the Glorious Revolution, a seminal event in British history. NIE, I argued, 
suffers from a number of weaknesses. For instance, the “cookie-cutter” approach employed 
by NIE scholars in only promoting secure property rights is reductive, at best, and Western-
centric, at worst. Moreover, I pointed out that there is no theory of institutional change within 
NIE. As a result, NIE is unable to account for the lack of global convergence towards Anglo-
Saxon-style institutions as well as for the persistence of dysfunctional institutions, especially 
in developing countries. 
In the second section of this paper, I first detailed the critical institutionalist method 
for institutional analysis. I pointed out that it was the changing nature of resource 
distribution—over hundreds of years— in Britain (agriculture, trade, commerce) that enabled 
the Whigs to bring about the actual events of the Glorious Revolution. I showed that by 
specifically factoring in actual distribution of resources, the critical institutionalist method is 
superior to NIE for providing a workable theory of institutional change and for explaining the 
persistence of dysfunctional institutions, especially in developing countries as these countries 
often suffer from systemic distributional conflicts. 
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